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Abstract 
 
Crowdfunding gives opportunities to novice 
entrepreneurs to raise funding for their novel ideas. 
However, lack of monitoring of projects and funds 
coupled with the lack of experience of project 
initiators create high levels of uncertainty for 
potential funders. In this study, we aim to examine 
how funders’ decision making process is affected by 
different types of uncertainty related to the project 
initiators. Unlike traditional e-commerce where 
consumers buy a finished product, in patronage 
based crowdfunding platforms, funders invest in and 
buy a product that is yet to be finished. This creates a 
unique uncertainty based on project initiators’ 
competence. Our results show that uncertainty based 
on project initiators’ competence and opportunism 
increase product performance uncertainty. Moreover, 
the dynamics of project initiator and product 
uncertainty are affected by the complexity of the 
product. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Sharing economy is a new form of online 
transaction activity that utilizes the contemporary 
information technology to promote a more efficient 
method for allocating surplus resources [17][32]. By 
providing an opportunity for participants to connect 
to each other, sharing economy is gradually 
becoming a unique but less-regulated economic 
activity due to lack of a rigorous overseeing system 
compared to more traditional and established e-
commerce [25]. The absence of such system creates 
unique challenges to participants, especially the 
amount of uncertainty they need to cope with [33].  
Crowdfunding is a prime example of sharing 
economy activity where participants encounter 
various types of uncertainty [6]. As a new form of 
fund raising method, crowdfunding has attained 
widespread popularity and attention in recent years. 
Crowdfunding aims at distributed audiences over the 
Internet so that there are higher chances for new 
entrepreneurs and wide range of products to be 
funded [26]. However, existing research indicates 
that investment activities in crowdfunding is mostly 
based on herding behavior [8][9][18]. One potential 
explanation of this behavior is the high level of 
uncertainty since investors have limited information 
about the project initiators (seller) and their products. 
More specifically, the product that crowdfunding will 
afford usually is one of a kind and also yet to be 
created if it is successfully funded [2]. Due to this 
nature, funders are facing a higher product 
uncertainty since there are fewer existing products 
can be compared to, and almost no previous history 
of the focal product. Therefore funders have to 
evaluate the quality of the project initiator and 
subsequently infer the potential quality of the product 
yet to be produced. As shown by previous research, 
product uncertainty is directly affected by seller 
uncertainty [12], however compared to traditional e-
commerce users whose main concern is whether 
seller is honest and ethical (e.g. seller advertises the 
authentic product but provides the counterfeit) 
[15][28], crowdfunding investors are facing a new 
type of seller uncertainty because not only they need 
to assess seller’s ethical traits, but also seller’s 
capability to produce and deliver the promised 
product [23].  
We postulate that on a crowdfunding platform, 
when funders are uncertain about products, they infer 
the product quality via project initiators, they 
experience both types of seller uncertainty, which are 
distinct and therefore should be examined separately. 
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For example, the project initiator can be faithful and 
ethical at the beginning of the project, but later due to 
the limitation of his/her capability, fails to meet the 
expectation, resulting in lower quality products, 
delivery delay, or even project cancellation. Parallel 
to these arguments, in this paper, our goal is to 
explore this unique feature and discover how this 
challenge affects decision-making process. Main 
research questions we aim to answer are: 
RQ1: when funders infer a product quality, what 
types of seller uncertainty are they facing during 
decision-making process? 
RQ2: how the dynamics between different types of 
seller uncertainty affect funders’ perception on 
product uncertainty? 
Based upon agent theory and extant judgement 
and decision making research, we propose two 
constructs associated with sharing economy: seller 
opportunism uncertainty (SOU), which captures 
ethical characteristics of sellers (e.g. whether seller is 
honest) and seller-competence-uncertainty (SCU), 
which captures actual capability of sellers to deliver 
services/products. As an example, imagine a project 
initiator proposes a new project. Funders may be 
uncertain about the quality of the product since the 
product has not been created yet. They can only infer 
the performance of the product from the information  
project initiator provides on the platform. Therefore, 
funders may concern about the project initiator 
regarding 1) whether project initiator discloses all 
information faithfully (SOU), and 2) whether project 
initiator has the capability to deliver the product 
(SCU) even though he/she does not intent to deceive 
funders. By conceptualizing these two uncertainties, 
we attempt to provide richer understanding of funders’ 
information processing and decision making process, 
especially how these two different types of seller 
uncertainty affect the product uncertainty. We argue 
that SOU are SCU distinct, and each reflects funders’ 
unique perception about seller uncertainty, and 
therefore both of them should affect the product 
uncertainty. Furthermore, investors are likely to 
perceive different levels of SOU and SCU based on 
product complexity, such that the higher the product 
complexity the stronger the effect of SOU and SCU 
on product uncertainty, and the changes in SCU 
should be more evident than SOU.  
Overall we aim to make two main contributions 
and extend the existing research: first, we identify the 
types of uncertainty that funders need to cope with in 
the crowdfunding environment. Compared to treating 
seller uncertainty as a single construct, our research 
shows that seller’s competence uncertainty is 
independent of seller’s opportunism uncertainty. 
Second, we investigate the dynamics between SOU 
and SCU with respect to product complexity. This is 
an important aspect of the dynamics because our 
results reveal that the impact of SOU and SCU varies 
according to the level of product complexity. It 
should be noted that, there are different forms of 
sharing economy activity such as ride sharing, 
accommodation based, crowdfunding, and each form 
possesses its own unique characteristics.  The 
research context of the current study is set in 
crowdfunding environment, which is one of the most 
popular sharing economy activities. We believe this 
context can exemplify the difference between SOU 
and SCU, and best serve our research purpose to 
explore various dimensions of seller uncertainty, and 
the dynamics between seller uncertainty and product 
uncertainty while the product complexity varies. 
 
2. Literature Review & Hypothesis 
Development 
 
Previous research has shown that seller 
uncertainty can significantly impact users’ perception 
of e-commerce vendors and the products they sell 
[12][30]. Vendors with established reputation are 
more successful in relieving buyers’ fear about seller 
opportunism [30], and consequently buyers are more 
likely to accept and purchase from these reputable 
sellers [15]. In other words, buyers perceive these 
sellers to be trustworthy, and this sense of trust 
between sellers and buyers has been proved to be 
very important in the decision-making process 
[4][12]. However, establishing trust between sellers 
and buyers may require significant amount of time 
through repeated transactions [13]. It is probably 
even harder to achieve in the crowdfunding context 
because many project initiators are novice 
entrepreneurs and may not have prior successful 
experiences 0. Thus, the principal-agent problem 
manifests in such environment [5][24].  
In e-commerce, buyers (principal) concern that 
sellers (agent) may hide necessary information before 
the transaction, or may not act ethically after payment 
is received [30]. The main obstacle for buyers to 
purchase confidently is assessing the uncertainty. 
Here, we focus on two major types of uncertainty 
experienced by the buyers, seller uncertainty and 
product uncertainty [12].  
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2.1 Seller Uncertainty 
 
The seller uncertainty construct is particularly 
critical in the judgement and decision making 
discipline [3] [31]. Our understanding of seller 
uncertainty has evolved during past decades. The 
advancement of information technology, the 
emergence of the Internet and new purchasing 
behaviors create unique challenges. In the past, 
consumers encounter seller uncertainty in a face-to-
face environment, and they may infer seller’s quality 
more directly.  However consumers right now need to 
cope with such uncertainty in a much more complex 
environment, where purchase can be completed via 
both physical and virtual media. In this context, 
consumers may not be able to evaluate sellers’ traits 
comprehensively, and information asymmetry issue 
is even more challenging to uncover [27].  
In the current study, seller uncertainty is 
conceptualized as opportunism uncertainty and 
competence uncertainty. The former captures the 
perceived opportunism of the project initiator as a 
result of lack of any monitoring mechanisms once the 
project is fully funded, whereas the latter captures the 
perceived capability of a project initiator to deliver a 
high performing product. While seller’s opportunism 
uncertainty has been studied extensively in previous 
research [29][30], seller’s competence uncertainty 
has not been scrutinized closely. Although the 
competence issue is prominent in many 
sharing/access economy activities [14][23], 
consumers may not conceive this uncertainty 
completely.  
As identified by existing research, in e-business, 
seller uncertainty is caused by buyers’ incapability to 
evaluate sellers due to the ex ante sellers’ 
misrepresentation of products and ex post seller’s 
opportunism [12][30]. In other words, buyer will 
perceive high seller uncertainty when sellers do not 
fully disclose their characteristics (ex ante) and do 
not cooperate afterwards (ex post) [12]. As we can 
see, these two potential problems that lead to seller 
uncertainty are both related to sellers’ honesty. In 
crowdfunding environment, seller uncertainty also 
exists and greatly obscures projects’ quality and 
success. However, it is displayed differently in 
patronage type of crowdfunding (e.g. Kickstarter) 
from traditional online market. First, project initiators 
do not primarily aim and “sell” the products for 
profits, rather, project initiators are willing to offer 
those products at a lower price compared to the future 
retail price [20]. Second, project initiators may not 
have intention to purposely conceal any products’ 
features ex ante, because (1) all products are new and 
therefore have chances of defects and (2) most 
products are advertised even before the prototypes 
are created, and are due in the future, thus even 
sellers themselves cannot successfully evaluate 
products. However, even though sellers in 
crowdfunding contexts may not have the motivation 
to hide important information, the potential ex ante 
peril still exists since sellers may be too optimistic 
about their capabilities and products’ performance. 
Therefore, this uncertainty is not due to seller’s 
dishonesty but rather it is due to seller’s competence. 
This unique uncertainty is in addition to seller’s 
opportunism uncertainty, which exists in traditional 
online markets [16], since project initiators may be 
shirking after their projects are fully funded, which 
results in low quality end products.  
To summarize, in crowdfunding context, seller 
uncertainty has two distinct dimensions. On the one 
hand, funders are concerned about whether sellers are 
competent enough to finish the product on time. On 
the other hand, funders fear that project initiators are 
not motivated to deliver high quality products. Based 
on these distinct features, we define seller uncertainty 
in the crowdfunding contexts as seller’s opportunism 
(ex ante) and seller’s competence (ex post). 
Previous research, especially e-business research, 
has mainly focused on seller uncertainty, whereas 
product uncertainty has not been studied extensively 
[12]. Limited number of existing studies reported the 
positive effect of seller uncertainty on product 
uncertainty [12]. Two types of product uncertainty 
have drawn attention from scholars: performance 
uncertainty and product fit [19]. Performance 
uncertainty captures how well the finished product 
will perform as described initially. Product fit 
captures the match between product attributes and the 
expectations of the buyer and whether the buyer will 
have a positive experience with the product after the 
purchase. These two aspects of product uncertainty 
are considered distinct [19]. In this study, we 
examine product performance uncertainty which is 
closely related to seller uncertainty. Following the 
literature, we posit the positive effect of seller 
uncertainty on product uncertainty. That is; 
H1a: Other things being equal, seller-
competence-uncertainty will increase product 
performance uncertainty. 
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H1b: Other things being equal, seller-
opportunism-uncertainty will increase product 
performance uncertainty. 
 
2.3 The Moderating Role of Product 
Complexity 
 
Previous research has shown that when product 
complexity increases, consumers perceive higher 
levels of uncertainty [21]. In the current study, we 
postulate that when making decisions in a 
crowdfunding environment, funders usually face both 
types of seller uncertainties simultaneously, and they 
interact and exert influence during the decision-
making process. Thus, investigating the dynamics of 
SOU and SCU with regards to complexity can 
provide a more complete understanding of the effect 
of seller uncertainty on product uncertainty.  
Existing research reports that when people believe 
they can control their decision making process, they 
overestimate their decision performance. This 
phenomenon is denoted as “illusion of control” 
[11][22]. In the crowdfunding context, when product 
complexity is low, funders may have the “illusion of 
control” because the skills/capability needed to 
accomplish such project is not as challenging for the 
seller. As a result, funders may perceive low seller 
competence uncertainty. Yet, seller opportunism 
uncertainty may still play an important role when 
product complexity is low since it is related to the 
seller’s ethical nature, not to the product’s features, 
although the level of such uncertainty may be lower 
compared to the high complexity situation. In other 
words, the “illusion of control” occurs when funders 
either have a good understanding of the product or 
the product itself is relatively easy to manufacture. In 
either case, due to illusion of control, funders’ main 
concern on sellers’ capability may not be as salient as 
the concern on sellers’ opportunistic behaviors to 
deliver low quality products.  
For instance, if the crowdfunding project is a 
photo album by a photographer, the perceived 
product complexity would be low and the quality of 
the photo album is more likely to be dependent on the 
photographer’s intentions (e.g., will she finish the 
photo album) rather her capabilities (e.g., can she 
take the photos and make a book out of them). On the 
other hand, the concern about seller’s competence 
arises when the product complexity is high. In these 
situation, funders’ lack of knowledge about the 
product raises concern regarding the sellers’ 
capability of delivering the products as promised.  
We argue that there is a distinction between the 
sources of these two types of uncertainties. In seller 
opportunism uncertainty, decision maker’s main 
concern is the uncertainty as a result of seller’s 
opportunism; whereas in seller competence 
uncertainty, the decision maker focuses on the 
attributes and specification of products. In other 
words, under different levels of project complexity 
and innovativeness, the nature of concerns on sellers’ 
uncertainty is different. One should notice that the 
distinctive features of SOU and SCU does not 
suggest that individuals experience only one type of 
uncertainty, instead, they concern both seller’s 
opportunism and seller’s competence, and their 
magnitude varies under different levels of project 
complexity. Parallel to these discussions, we 
hypothesize that: 
H2a: Other things being equal, in high product 
complexity, SCU will have a more positive effect than 
SOU on product performance uncertainty.  
H2b: Other things being equal, in low product 
complexity, SOU will have a more positive effect than 
SCU on product performance uncertainty. 
 
3. Methods 
 
The survey questions used in the study are all 
validated by the previous research. Each construct is 
briefly described as follow.  
Seller Uncertainty Based on the conceptualization, 
seller uncertainty construct has two dimensions: 
seller competence uncertainty and seller opportunism 
uncertainty. Seller competence uncertainty items are 
adapted from previous research [15][30], which 
mainly focus on funder’s perceived uncertainty 
towards seller’s capability to deliver a satisfied 
product. Seller opportunism uncertainty items 
measure the perceived uncertainty of whether sellers 
can faithfully finish the projects with high quality. 
These questions are also adapted from existing 
studies [12][30].  
Product Uncertainty: Product uncertainty is 
measured as the perceived uncertainty about future 
quality or performance of the product. It captures 
perceptions of funders of the quality and performance 
of the product with respect to project description [30]. 
Project Complexity: Consistent with previous 
research on task complexity [21], we first select 
different types of projects including both experience 
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goods and search goods. Projects that may need 
certain level of expertise to accurately assess product 
features, such as a 3D printing device, are deemed as 
a high complexity project. On the other hand, 
projects that may be evaluated with less professional 
knowledge, such as creating a photo album, are 
considered as a low complexity project. The 
perceived project complexity is measured by a 7-
point Likert scale. If the mean is less than 3.5, the 
project is considered low complexity, if the mean is 
more than 3.5, the project is considered high 
complexity. Furthermore, in order to find the 
products which correctly represent complexity level, 
we conducted a pilot study to screen the most 
appropriate products. In the pilot study, six different 
products (three high complexity; three low 
complexity) were shown to and evaluated by subject. 
The product rated with the highest complexity level 
is chosen as the high complexity project (3D printer), 
and similarly product rated with the lowest 
complexity level is used as the low complexity 
project (photo album). 
The data for the current study is obtained through 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MT). Compared to 
traditional student samples used in decision making 
research, subjects recruited via MT are more 
demographically representative, and therefore ensure 
the generalizability of the findings. Previous research 
also found that common issues in experiment design 
such as internal (e.g. subjects’ attentiveness) and 
external validity (e.g. results persistency in other 
experiment settings) do not constitute problems in 
data collected from MT subjects [7]. Because 
crowdfunding is not legal in all countries, we limit 
MT subjects to the United States and Canada. 
Moreover, to ensure high quality response from MT, 
we required that subjects must have high acceptance 
rate (> 95%) from previous tasks on MT, and also 
added random attention check questions.  
In sum, 326 subjects are recruited from MT. 
Among them, 19 failed the attention check which 
results in a final 307 valid answers, and for each valid 
answer, a participant were paid $0.70 as a reward. 
Among all of the 307 subjects, 163 (53.1%) were 
male, 144 (46.9%) were female. The average age of 
the subjects is in the 45-50 range. In general, subjects 
are satisfied with social media platforms (e.g. 
Facebook) (mean: 5.21/7) and online transactions 
(e.g. online payment, e-commerce) (mean: 5.92/7), 
and most of them are relatively familiar with 
crowdfunding platform such as Kickstarter (mean: 
4.74/7). Moreover, perceived project complexity is 
tested again to confirm the results of the pilot study. 
The results of the t-test show that there is a 
significant difference (p < .001) between perceived 
complexity of a photo album project (mean: 2.98/7) 
(low complexity) and a 3D printer project (mean: 
5.43/7) (high complexity).  
 
4. Results 
 
We used path model analysis to test the 
hypotheses of the current study. Our analysis shows 
that under both scenarios (low vs. high), seller 
competence uncertainty and seller opportunism 
uncertainty have significant positive effect on 
product performance uncertainty. For the low 
complexity project, seller competence uncertainty is 
positively correlated with product performance 
uncertainty (β = 0.31, p < .01), and seller 
opportunism uncertainty is positively correlated with 
product performance uncertainty (β = 0.50, p < .01). 
For the high complexity project, seller competence 
uncertainty is positively correlated with product 
performance uncertainty (β = 0.20, p < .01), and 
seller opportunism uncertainty is positively correlated 
with product performance uncertainty (β = 0.63, p 
< .01). These results support H1a and H1b. 
To test the moderating effect of product 
complexity (H2a & H2b), we compare the paths 
coefficients within each scenario (low or high). 
Within scenario comparison shows that in the low 
complexity scenario, the path coefficient of seller 
competence uncertainty to product uncertainty (β = 
0.31, p < .01) is smaller than the path coefficient of 
seller opportunism uncertainty to product uncertainty 
(β = 0.50, p < .01). This result indicates that subjects 
perceive stronger seller opportunism uncertainty than 
seller competence uncertainty when evaluating low 
complexity product, therefore supporting H2a. 
However, contrary to our expectations, in high 
complexity scenario subjects also perceive stronger 
seller opportunism uncertainty (β = 0.63, p < .01) 
than seller competence uncertainty β = 0.20, p < .01). 
Thus H2b is not supported. Compared to low 
complexity scenario, it seems that seller opportunism 
uncertainty is even stronger in high complexity 
scenario, and furthermore the seller competence 
uncertainty decreases. This result may due to a halo 
effect, under which if people consider a project is 
complicated, their concern can spill over to sellers’ 
ethics. We further investigated this unexpected result 
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in our post-hoc analysis. These results are shown in 
Table 1. 
 Product Complexity 
Path Low  High  
SCU  PU 0.31 0.20 
SOU  PU 0.50 0.63 
Table 1. Path coefficients 
 
4.1 Post-hoc analysis 
 
To further understand the dynamics between 
seller opportunism uncertainty and seller competence 
uncertainty under different levels of project 
complexity, we compare the coefficients of the same 
path across different scenarios (between low & high) 
using group analysis.  
The group analysis is conducted using a 
permutation method developed by [10]. Based on 
path coefficients and standard errors, t value is 
obtained by using the following formula: 
𝑡 =
𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒1− 𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒2
[√
(𝑚−1)2
(𝑚+𝑛−2)
∗𝑆.𝐸.𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒1
2 + 
(𝑛−1)2
(𝑚+𝑛−2)
∗ 𝑆.𝐸.𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒2
2 ]∗[√
1
𝑚
+
1
𝑛
]
  
Utilizing this method, we find that there is a 
significant difference (p < .05) between the path 
coefficients of seller opportunism uncertainty to 
product uncertainty (i.e. the increase from 0.50 to 
0.63 is significant), and a marginally significant 
difference (p < .1) (i.e. the decrease from 0.31 to 0.20) 
is found between path coefficients of seller 
competence uncertainty to product uncertainty. The 
results seem to imply that funders’ concern on project 
initiators’ opportunism behaviors increases while the 
project complexity becomes high, and it is even 
becoming funders’ major concern and may start to 
ignore whether project initiators have the capability 
to deliver the products.  
As discussed, contrary to expectations, our result 
shows that seller competence uncertainty has a 
smaller effect for inferring product quality when 
project complexity increases. One factor that may 
lead to this phenomenon is funders’ familiarity with 
the product. For example, when people have the 
knowledge of a certain product, they may understand 
the required level of expertise to build an excellent 
product. On the other hand, when people are 
unfamiliar with the product, they may not have the 
ability to assess project initiators’ capability, rather 
they may forego their concern on sellers’ competence 
and focus on sellers’ opportunism behaviors, which 
they can try to infer based on the information 
provided. In order to verify our speculation, we 
conduct the within scenario t-test to compare the 
level of perceived seller competence uncertainty. For 
the high complexity project, people who are more 
familiar with the product indeed perceive more seller 
competence uncertainty compared to people who are 
unfamiliar with a 3D printer (= 4.32 vs.  = 3.88, p 
<.05). In other words, they are more aware of the 
existence of sellers’ competence uncertainty. This 
speculation is also confirmed in low complexity 
scenario. For the Photo Album project, funders who 
claim to be more familiar with the project has a 
higher concern on sellers’ competence (= 3.56) 
compared to funders who are less familiar with the 
project (= 3.14), and a significant difference is also 
observed (p < .05). 
 
5. Discussion 
 
This study aims to examine how funders’ decision 
making process is affected due to perception of 
different types of seller uncertainties. Specifically, 
we investigate the effects of seller opportunism and 
seller competence uncertainty on product uncertainty, 
as well as the dynamics between these two types 
seller of uncertainty under different levels of product 
complexity. We find that funders experience two 
distinct types of seller uncertainty, and their effect on 
product uncertainty varies by project complexity. 
Some of the key findings of the study are as follows. 
First, under either high or low project complexity, 
funders concern more about sellers’ opportunistic 
behaviors, and less about sellers’ capability to deliver 
a good quality product. Furthermore, when project 
complexity increases, the effect of seller’s 
opportunism uncertainty on funders’ evaluation of 
potential products is significantly higher, compared 
to the same effect when complexity level is low. 
These results seem to imply that when the project 
becomes complex, funders do not evaluate the quality 
of potential products based upon project initiators’ 
capability, rather funders will “by default” 
acknowledge and believe that project initiators have 
the expertise to accomplish the projects. This is 
especially the case for funders who are not familiar 
with the product. According to funders’ perceptions, 
whether the delivered products will possess good 
quality mainly depends on project initiators’ good 
faith. 
Our findings have several implications. Compared 
to previous research which mainly focuses on seller’s 
ethical characteristics [12][30], this study proposes 
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that seller competence uncertainty may independently 
exert influence on perceived product uncertainty. 
Moreover, although different types of seller 
uncertainty have been investigated in the literature, 
these studies are mostly in the context of e-business 
or at least for finished products, whereas in a 
crowdfunding context, it is important to investigate 
funders’ uncertainty regarding sellers’ competence of 
delivering satisfactory products, because the decision 
maker is not only a buyer but also an investor of a 
product which is yet to be manufactured. Therefore, 
in addition to sellers’ ethnical characteristics, the 
product performance uncertainty experienced by 
funders can also be affected by sellers’ competence. 
Furthermore, the magnitude of seller uncertainty 
perceived by people are significantly different. 
Especially for high complexity products, people have 
a stronger concern about seller’s opportunistic 
behaviors, whereas they have less concern about 
seller’ competence. The further investigation of our 
unexpected result revealed that seller competence 
uncertainty is partly determined by funders’ 
familiarity of the product. Those who have 
familiarity with the product have more concerns of 
seller competence both in high and low product 
complexity, highlighting the complexity of 
understanding decision-making process. 
This research also has practical implications. As 
discussed in the beginning, the urgent issue faced by 
all crowdfunding platforms is that there might be too 
many “disqualified” projects, where funders do not 
have access to all information, especially the 
crowdfunding website 1) does not have a supervisory 
system to monitor the quality of the finished product; 
and 2) provides low barriers to entry. Combined with 
these issues, people already started to have negative 
impacts on crowdfunding due to their unsatisfactory 
decisions on failed projects. The negative attitude 
towards crowdfunding could further hurt the platform 
since crowdfunding websites could make a profit 
only when projects are successfully funded. The 
findings of our current research may guide future 
features of crowdfunding platforms. One the one 
hand, crowdfunding websites should enforce 
administrative mechanism to supervise and inspect to 
filter out disqualified projects, on the other hand, 
crowdfunding platforms could integrate social 
networking sites into current functions in order to 
assist funders with their decision making. For 
examples, if funders are able to obtain opinions from 
other fellow funders, or share their investing 
activities with friends to receive comments on the 
crowdfunding platform, funders may retrieve extra 
information to help them formulate decision.  As 
people become more satisfied with their choices, they 
would reinvest on the platform, which also benefits 
the platform. Given that most of popular projects on 
the crowdfunding platforms are high-tech products, 
which accompanied by high complexity, 
crowdfunding platforms may disclose more 
information about project initiators and their 
credentials.  
Although the research tries to account for 
extensive aspects of study design and 
conceptualization, it also has limitation. One 
limitation is due to subjects’ geographic 
characteristics. The sample of this study is mainly 
from North America, therefore there might be a 
cultural bias. It is widely known that uncertainty 
avoidance and the development of trust is closely 
related to national culture [13]. Since the current 
study is conducted predominantly in one type of 
culture, it would be constructive to test the same 
model in different countries, or under another cultural 
background. In the future research, we would like to 
examine the influence of such variables, which may 
include culture, gender and age, on the perception of 
different types of seller uncertainties, especially when 
these variables interact with the project complexity.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
We now live in an era that everyone is connected 
by Internet, where social media plays an important 
role in our daily life. On the one hand, people are 
enjoying the convenience of abundant information 
existing on the Internet, and on the other hand, people 
are burdening with the possibility of information 
overload which causes difficulty in making decisions. 
How to effectively using and evaluating the 
information is becoming a major concern today 
compared to difficulties of lack of information 
experienced in the past. In a crowdfunding 
environment, people have to decide between many 
similar products in a situation where most of the time 
they are not familiar with the project initiators or 
their innovative products. Therefore, they have to 
depend on certain benchmarks to confirm or validate 
their decisions. Current research provides new 
insights on funders’ decision making mechanism, and 
how crowdfunding platforms can help funders to 
reduce their concern. 
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As a consequence of rapid development of 
Internet and innovative use of such technology, 
people are constantly facing new challenge when 
making decisions. It is important to accurately 
identify what our question is and why we have such 
concerns. By examining the influence of different 
types of seller uncertainty, we can establish a more 
comprehensive understanding of who will be offering 
the products/services, and how they will manufacture 
and deliver their products/services, which may help 
us evaluate such products/services better. 
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